

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 115-23**  
**OFFERED BY MR. FITZPATRICK OF**  
**PENNSYLVANIA**

At the end of subtitle H of title XII, add the following new section:

1   **SEC. 12\_\_ . ANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA**  
2                   **NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERA-**  
3                   **TION.**

4       (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
5   ings:

6           (1) Iran developed a close working relationship  
7   with North Korea on many ballistic missile pro-  
8   grams, dating back to an acquisition of Scud mis-  
9   siles from North Korea in the mid-1 980s.

10          (2) By the mid-1 980s North Korea reverse-en-  
11   gineered Scud B missiles originally received from  
12   Egypt, and developed the 500-kilometer range Scud  
13   C missile in 1991, and sold both the Scud B and  
14   Scud C, as well as missile production technology, to  
15   Iran.

16          (3) In 1992, then-Director of Central Intel-  
17   ligence Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress,

1 identified Iran as a recipient of North Korean Scud  
2 missiles.

3 (4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intel-  
4 ligence James Woolsey provided more detail, stating  
5 that North Korea had sold Iran extended range  
6 Scud C missiles and agreed to sell other forms of  
7 missile technology.

8 (5) Annual threat assessments from the intel-  
9 ligence community during the 1990s showed that  
10 North Korea's ongoing export of ballistic missiles  
11 provided a qualitative increase in capabilities to  
12 countries such as Iran.

13 (6) The same threat assessments noted that  
14 Iran was using North Korean ballistic missile goods  
15 and services to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in  
16 the production of medium-range ballistic missiles.

17 (7) The intelligence community assessed in the  
18 1990s that Iran's acquisition of missile systems or  
19 key missile-related components could improve Iran's  
20 ability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile  
21 (ICBM).

22 (8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence com-  
23 munity continued to assess that North Korean co-  
24 operation with Iran's ballistic missile program was  
25 ongoing and significant.

1           (9) North Korea built the Al Kibar nuclear re-  
2       actor in Syria that was bombed in 2007. Syria failed  
3       to report the construction of the reactor to the  
4       International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which  
5       was Syria's obligation under its safeguards agree-  
6       ment with the agency.

7           (10) Official sources confirm that Iran and  
8       North Korea have engaged in various forms of clan-  
9       destine nuclear cooperation.

10          (11) North Korea and Iran obtained designs  
11       and materials related to uranium enrichment from a  
12       clandestine procurement network run by Abdul  
13       Qadeer Khan.

14          (12) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported,  
15       with the assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium  
16       hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) gas to Libya, which was in-  
17       tended to be used in Libya's clandestine nuclear  
18       weapons program.

19          (13) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to  
20       North Korea to witness its three previous nuclear  
21       tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.

22          (14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea con-  
23       ducted its fourth nuclear weapons test. On Sep-  
24       tember 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth nu-  
25       clear weapons test.

1           (15) Before North Korea’s 2013 test, a senior  
2     American official was quoted as saying “it’s very  
3     possible that North Koreans are testing for two  
4     countries”.

5           (16) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea  
6     signed an agreement for technological and scientific  
7     cooperation.

8           (17) In an April 2015 interview with CNN,  
9     then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that  
10    North Korea and Iran “could be” cooperating to de-  
11    velop a nuclear weapon.

12          (18) On March 11, 2017, Director of National  
13    Intelligence Dan Coats provided written testimony to  
14    Congress that stated that Pyongyang’s “export of  
15    ballistic missiles and associated materials to several  
16    countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assist-  
17    ance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor ...  
18    illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous  
19    technologies”.

20          (19) A 2016 Congressional Research Service re-  
21    port confirmed that “ballistic missile technology co-  
22    operation between the two [Iran and North Korea]  
23    is significant and meaningful”.

24          (20) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of  
25    United States Northern Command, testified to Con-

1       gress on April 14, 2016, that “Iran’s continuing  
2       pursuit of long-range missile capabilities and bal-  
3       listic missile and space launch programs, in defiance  
4       of United Nations Security Council resolutions, re-  
5       mains a serious concern”.

6           (21) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act  
7       for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–277) re-  
8       pealed requirements for the intelligence community  
9       to provide unclassified annual report to Congress on  
10      the “Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons  
11      of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional  
12      Munitions”, the number of unclassified reports to  
13      Congress on nuclear-weapons issues decreased con-  
14      siderably.

15          (22) Absent these reports, the President has  
16      not been required to detail to Congress the assess-  
17      ment of cooperation between North Korea and Iran  
18      on nuclear weapon or ballistic missile development.

19      (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
20      gress that—

21          (1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and  
22      North Korea represent a serious threat to allies of  
23      the United States in the Middle East, Europe, and  
24      Asia, members of the Armed Forces deployed in  
25      those regions, and ultimately the United States;

1           (2) further cooperation between Iran and North  
2       Korea on nuclear weapons or ballistic missile tech-  
3       nology is not in the security interests of the United  
4       States or our allies;

5           (3) United Nations Security Council Resolution  
6       2231 (2015), which was unanimously adopted by the  
7       United Nations Security Council and supported by  
8       the international community, called upon Iran not to  
9       undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles  
10      designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weap-  
11      ons, including launches of such missiles, for an eight  
12      year period beginning in 2015; and

13          (4) the Director of National Intelligence has as-  
14      sessed that Iran would use ballistic missiles as its  
15      “preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons”  
16      which could eventually threaten the United States.

17      (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—

18          (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
19      after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-  
20      nually thereafter, the President, in coordination with  
21      the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,  
22      and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall sub-  
23      mit to the appropriate committees of Congress a re-  
24      port that includes—

1 (A) an assessment of the extent of co-  
2 operation on nuclear programs, ballistic missile  
3 development, chemical and biological weapons  
4 development, or conventional weapons programs  
5 between the Government of Iran and the Gov-  
6 ernment of the Democratic People's Republic of  
7 North Korea, including the identity of Iranian  
8 and North Korean persons that have knowingly  
9 engaged in or directed the provision of material  
10 support or the exchange of information (includ-  
11 ing through the transfer of goods, services,  
12 technology, or intellectual property) between the  
13 Government of Iran and the Government of the  
14 Democratic People's Republic of North Korea;  
15 and

16 (B) a determination whether any of the ac-  
17 tivities described in subparagraph (A) violate  
18 United Nations Security Council Resolutions  
19 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087  
20 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2231 (2015), 2270  
21 (2016) and 2321 (2016).

22 (2) FORM.—The report required under para-  
23 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,  
24 but may contain a classified annex.

1           (3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS  
2       DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appro-  
3       pate committees of Congress” means—

4           (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
5       the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se-  
6       lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;  
7       and

8           (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
9       Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma-  
10      nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
11      House of Representatives.

